We live in a polarised world where conspiracy theories proliferate, but some people are more inclined than others to consume and propagate these theories rather than ignore or demystify them.

“Birds are a myth, they’re an illusion, they’re a lie. Wake up, America!” — this bizarre message gave rise to a popular conspiracy movement among young people in the US. It all started as a joke—a random attendee at a 2017 rally, Peter McIndoe, a 23-year-old student, wrote the words “Birds Aren’t Real” on a poster. Someone filmed it and the video went viral. Soon there were videos of young people chanting the same words or painting them on high school walls.

That’s when Peter McIndoe decided to take the prank seriously and play his character as believably as possible, realising that people resonated with his fantastical message. For four years, the young man promoted the theory that the US government had wiped out all birds and replaced them with surveillance drones. As he later admitted, McIndoe wrote a false history of the movement, began marketing promotional items with the message “Birds Aren’t Real,” created a website, toured the country, and even hired an actor to play a supposed ex-CIA agent who confirmed the existence of the surveillance programme.

In 2021, McIndoe admitted that the whole thing was “not a shallow satire of conspiracies from the outside. It is from the deep inside,” a benign way of using the absurd to combat the absurdity of conspiracy theories. After all, the young man argued, if a person could take something so ridiculous seriously, they would probably believe any other conspiracy theory.

In the grip of false certainties

Plenty of us believe at least one conspiracy theory. The more conspiracy theories a survey includes, the more people say they believe at least one of them.[1] Why is this phenomenon so widespread? What do people who are prone to conspiracy theories have in common, and what are the characteristics that predispose them to conspiracy thinking?

“Conspiracy theories are complicated, and the reasons people believe them are also complicated.”[2]

Although many answers to questions about the profile of people prone to conspiracy thinking are still vague, studies over the past decade have been able to articulate clearer explanations for the susceptibility of some individuals to conspiracy theories.

Sociodemographic characteristics

When asked to profile the average conspiracy theorist, most people think of a white, middle-aged man. However, studies have found no strong evidence of a link between demographic variables and the propensity to consume conspiratorial ideas (conspiratorial thinking tends to be evenly distributed across gender and race, and age differences are insignificant[3]), with one exception.

Educational attainment is a predictor of (in)adherence to conspiracy theories. Several studies have shown that higher levels of education and income correlate with a lower likelihood of believing in conspiracy theories[4]. A 2016 study identified factors that mediate the relationship between education and conspiracy beliefs. Firstly, education correlates with cognitive complexity—a person’s ability to perceive nuance and categories when judging a situation—and reduces the likelihood of adopting simplistic explanations for complex events. Secondly, education provides a sense of control over the individual’s social environment (susceptibility to conspiracy theories is associated with feelings of powerlessness, lack of control). Lastly, education helps individuals achieve higher incomes and relatively privileged positions in society, thus avoiding the risk of marginalisation.[5]

Psychological factors

Researchers argue that the appeal of conspiracy theories increases when important psychological needs (epistemic, existential, or social) remain unmet.

The first of these needs is the epistemic need, which relates to the desire to know the truth, to have certainties, and to have clear information about the cause and meaning of the events we experience. According to psychology professor Daniel Jolley, conspiracy theories flourish in times of crisis, under conditions of uncertainty, when large or difficult to process events unfold. The aversion to the randomness of socio-political events drives people to find connections and causal explanations where none exist. The need to turn to conspiracy theories to find meaning and order is stronger in people who have difficulty tolerating uncertainty (and even experience distress in these circumstances). 

The need for cognitive closure (a term indicating a preference for quick certainties and a tendency to avoid ambiguity) has been associated with a predisposition to conspiracy explanations. Individuals who lack the ability or motivation to seek information from credible sources, and who lack the skills or tools to filter information, are more likely to fall into the trap of conspiracy theories.[6]

The siren song of absurd, implausible explanations sounds sweeter in the ears of those with unmet existential needs. People embrace conspiracy theories when they no longer feel safe or when they believe they have lost control, because these theories provide information to explain why they are not in control of the situation, explains researcher Karen Douglas. People who feel chronically powerless are more likely to believe, and those who are anxious or who have developed an anxious attachment style, characterised by an excessive preoccupation with their own safety and a tendency to exaggerate threats, are more likely to be drawn to unconventional theories.[7]

Feelings of exclusion, which arise in a variety of contexts (from job loss to unwanted loneliness), also predispose people to embrace unconventional or unlikely ideas. Although it is thought that religious people are more likely to believe conspiratorial messages because they operate more with principles of good and evil, the real reason for this predisposition is their minority position, says Professor Hugo Drochon. “It’s often about being in a minority position, so if you are highly religious in a secularised world you’re more likely to believe in conspiracy theories, but if you’re highly atheist in a religious world, you will also be susceptible.”[8]

The third category of essential needs relates to social needs (maintaining self-esteem and positive feelings about the group to which we belong). Studies have shown that people who are susceptible to conspiracy theories have negative feelings about the authorities and their peers in general, but they also have negative feelings about themselves and low self-esteem.[9] Embracing these theories restores a sense of order, of predictability, but also avoids self-blame or blaming one’s own group, shifting responsibility for what happens to others.

Cognitive style and worldview

The way we acquire and process information—our cognitive style—plays an important role in how we perceive reality.

There are two main patterns of thinking: analytical (requires effort, focuses on details, follows explicit steps) and intuitive (fast, implicit, does not proceed in carefully planned steps). Belief in conspiracy theories correlates positively with intuitive thinking and negatively with analytical style, and could even be discouraged by encouraging analytical thinking.[10] A team of researchers led by psychologist Viren Swami conducted a series of three studies that confirmed that subjects who were asked to think analytically became less conspiratorial.

A pessimistic worldview increases the likelihood of adopting various conspiracy theories, conclude researchers Anthony Lantian, Mike Wood, and Biljana Gjoneska in a review of studies on the subject.[11] People who are prone to conspiratorial ideas believe they live in a dangerous world that threatens the values and lifestyles of good people, lack trust in others, and adopt a simplistic Manichean (based on a good/bad dualism) view—for example, seeing politics as a confrontation between the opposing forces of absolute good and absolute evil.

Immune to conspiracy theories?

Under certain conditions, any of us can fall prey to conspiracy theories, says Professor Karen Douglas. A significant risk arises when we have unmet psychological needs, the most important of which are epistemic (to know the truth, to have clarity about what is going on), existential (related to safety, to be in control of things) and social (to protect our self-esteem and to have positive feelings about the group we belong to).[12]

“We can all be a bit paranoid at times… It’s part of human nature,” Professor Drochon also explains, while providing the key to distinguishing between ordinary people and those who are susceptible to implausible theories: their adherents are impervious to any new argument or information that might contradict their beliefs.[13]

As such, what saves us from the quicksand of conspiracy thinking is the realisation that we cannot operate with unchanging certainties when assessing partially known realities. As in driving, checking the blind spot is an essential safety procedure, but it is one that is practised only by those who never stop learning, because they are aware that they know less and less as they discover more and more.

Carmen Lăiu explores the demographics, psychological peculiarities and motivations of people who tend to believe in conspiracy theories.

Footnotes
[1]“Steven M. Smallpage, Hugo Drochon et al, ‘Who Are the Conspiracy Theorists? Demographics and Conspiracy Theories’, in Michael Butter and Peter Knight (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories, Routledge, London/New York, 2020, p. 264.”
[2]“Karen M. Douglas, Aleksandra Cichocka and Robbie M. Sutton, ‘Motivations, Emotions and Belief in Conspiracy Theories’, in Butter and Knight, op. cit. , p. 181.”
[3]“Joseph E. Uscinski and Joseph M. Parent, American Conspiracy Theories, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014, apud Smallpage, Drochon et al., op. cit., p. 267.”
[4]“Loc. cit.”
[5]“Jan-Willem van Prooijen, ‘Why Education Predicts Decreased Belief in Conspiracy Theories’, in Applied Cognitive Psychology, vol. 31, no. 1, January/February 2017, pp. 50-58.”
[6]“Douglas, Cichocka and Sutton, op. cit., pp. 181-183.”
[7]“Douglas, Cichocka and Sutton, op. cit., pp. 182-183.”
[8]“Phelan, op. cit.”
[9]“Katherine Levine Einstein and David M. Glick, ‘Do I Think BLS Data are BS? The Consequences of Conspiracy Theories,’ in Political Behavior (online), vol. 37, no. 3, 2015, pp. 679-701.”
[10]“https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0010027714001632.”
[11]“Anthony Lantian, Mike Wood, and Biljana Gjoneska, ‘Personality Traits, Cognitive Styles and Worldviews Associated with Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories’, in Butter and Knight, op. cit. , pp. 161-162.”
[12]“Phelan, art. cit.”
[13]“Loc. cit.”

“Steven M. Smallpage, Hugo Drochon et al, ‘Who Are the Conspiracy Theorists? Demographics and Conspiracy Theories’, in Michael Butter and Peter Knight (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories, Routledge, London/New York, 2020, p. 264.”
“Karen M. Douglas, Aleksandra Cichocka and Robbie M. Sutton, ‘Motivations, Emotions and Belief in Conspiracy Theories’, in Butter and Knight, op. cit. , p. 181.”
“Joseph E. Uscinski and Joseph M. Parent, American Conspiracy Theories, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014, apud Smallpage, Drochon et al., op. cit., p. 267.”
“Loc. cit.”
“Jan-Willem van Prooijen, ‘Why Education Predicts Decreased Belief in Conspiracy Theories’, in Applied Cognitive Psychology, vol. 31, no. 1, January/February 2017, pp. 50-58.”
“Douglas, Cichocka and Sutton, op. cit., pp. 181-183.”
“Douglas, Cichocka and Sutton, op. cit., pp. 182-183.”
“Phelan, op. cit.”
“Katherine Levine Einstein and David M. Glick, ‘Do I Think BLS Data are BS? The Consequences of Conspiracy Theories,’ in Political Behavior (online), vol. 37, no. 3, 2015, pp. 679-701.”
“https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0010027714001632.”
“Anthony Lantian, Mike Wood, and Biljana Gjoneska, ‘Personality Traits, Cognitive Styles and Worldviews Associated with Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories’, in Butter and Knight, op. cit. , pp. 161-162.”
“Phelan, art. cit.”